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I. INTRODUCTION
Article III of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he
Judicial Power shall extend to ... controversies ... between cit-
izens of different States."' Congress first authorized the federal courts
to exercise diversity jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 In
its current form, the diversity statute provides that "the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in the controversy exceeds . . $50,000 . .. , and is between ...
citizens of different States." 3
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. The Judiciary Act, Ch. 20, § 11, Stat. 78 (1789).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. 1990).
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The United States Supreme Court has always interpreted the di-
versity statute to require a complete diversity of citizenship between
the parties.4 However, the multitude of artificial legal entities5 doing
business presents the potential for numerous lawsuits where deter-
mining the parties and their corresponding citizenship becomes very
uncertain. For this reason, determining the citizenship of an artificial
business entity has been the source of heated debate and lengthy
discussion.6
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Carden v. Arkoma
Associates, considered whether an artificial entity may be a citizen
in its own right or whether the citizenship of the members comprising
the entity should govern for the purpose of federal jurisdiction. Spe-
cifically, the Court was asked to determine whether, in a suit brought
by a limited partnership, the citizenship of the limited partners must
be taken into account to establish whether complete diversity exists.'
In order to answer this question, the Supreme Court was required
to first address two issues:
(1) May a limited partnership be considered in its own right a citizen of the State
which created it, and;
(2) May a federal court look to the citizenship of only the general partners, but
not the limited partners, to determine whether there is complete diversity of cit-
izenship? 9
4. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (holding that "if there be two
or more joint plaintiffs, and two or more joint defendants, each of the plaintiffs must be capable
of suing each of the defendants, in the courts of the United States, in order to support the juris-
diction").
5. A legal entity is defined as "An entity, other than a natural person, who has sufficient
existence in legal contemplation that it can function legally, be sued or sue and make decisions through
agents as in the case of corporations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 804 (5th ed. 1979). As used through-
out this note, the term "entity" includes inter alia, corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships,
unions, joint stock companies, and business trusts.
6. See generally Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Diversity of Citizenship - The Citizenship of
Limited Partners Must Be Considered in Determining Whether Diversity Jurisdiction Exists, 46 GEo.
WASH. L. Ray. 657 (1978); Note, Limited Partners Limit the Availability of Federal Diversity Ju-
risdiction: Stouffer Corp. v. Breckenridge, 63 ST. Join's L. REv. 571 (1989). Contra Note, Diversity
Jurisdiction Over Unincorporated Business Entities: The Real Party In Interest as a Jurisdictional
Rule, 56 TEx. L. REv. 243 (1978); Note, Who Are the Real Parties In Interest for Purposes of
Determining Diversity Jurisdiction for Limited Partnerships?, 61 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1051 (1984).
7. 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990).
8. Id. at 1016.
9. Id. at 1017.
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Ultimately, a divided Court held that the citizenship of each lim-
ited partner was in fact critical to the determination of the citizenship
of the limited partnership. 0 With this holding, the Court firmly
resisted extending the rule treating corporations as "citizens" to other
artificial entities."
This comment discusses Carden v. Arkoma Associates to allow
the reader to more fully understand the majority's decision. The
holding is fraught with technical and logical minutiae. Yet, upon
close examination, the reasoning of the Court, the strict adherence
to precedent, and the avoidance of the occasion to legislate from
the bench make the holding in Carden sound.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arkoma Associates [hereinafter Arkoma] was a limited
partnership 12 organized under the laws of Arizona. 13 It brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louis-
iana against C. Tom Carden and Leonard L. Limes, citizens of
Louisiana.1 4 Arkoma's underlying claim in this case arose from a
contract dispute where Carden and Limes had acted as guarantors
of an agreement by which Arkoma leased certain drilling equipment
to Magee Drilling Company, Inc. [hereinafter Magee Drilling], a
Texas corporation.15 Arkoma relied upon diversity of citizenship for
federal jurisdiction. 16
Carden and Limes moved for dismissal on the ground that one
of Arkoma's limited partners was a citizen of Louisiana and thus
1O.' Id.
11. Id. at 1018.
12. A partnership is created under state law. See A. BRolmano, CRA E AND BROmBERO ON
PnanRTEsmr § 26, at 144 (1968). The general partners manage the business and are subject to personal
liability, while limited partners are exempt from liability so long as they refrain from participating
in management. Id. at 146. See also REvisED Umtrom LnMmD PARTNERsmP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 200
(Supp. 1988).
13. ARxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-302 (current version at ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-308 (1989)).
See also Arkoma Assoc. v. Carden, 874 F.2d 226, 228-29 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the two
statutes).
14. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1016.
15. Id.
16. Id.
1990]
3
Buch: Carden v. Arkoma Associates: A Refusal to Extend the Rule Treatin
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW RE VIEW
destroyed complete diversity. 17 The district court rejected this juris-
dictional challenge, but certified the question for interlocutory ap-
peal which the Fifth Circuit declined.18
Thereafter, Magee Drilling intervened alleging claims against Ar-
koma for separate violations of Texas law.' 9 Also, Magee Drilling
joined Carden and Limes in a counterclaim against Arkoma arising
from the original contract dispute. 2° Following a bench trial, the
district court awarded Arkoma money damages plus interest and the
attorney fees for the breach of contract claim.2' Further, the court
dismissed Carden and Limes' counterclaim as well as Magee Drill-
ing's intervention and counterclaim."
Carden, Limes, and Magee Drilling appealed. 21 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the rulings of the district court in favor of Arkoma.? With
respect to the jurisdictional challenge, the Fifth Circuit found the
requisite complete diversity. It ruled that the citizenship of the Ar-
koma limited partnership should be determined with reference to
only the partnership's general partner and not with respect to each
of the individual limited partners. 21
Again, the petitioners appealed and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 26 Considering only the jurisdictional chal-
lenge, the Court held that complete diversity was lacking with respect
to Carden and Limes. 27 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court which concluded that the single limited partner from Louis-
iana would destroy diversity. 28
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Arkoma Assoc. v. Carden, 874 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1988).
24. Id. at 227.
25. Id. at 229.
26. Carden v. Arkorna Assoc., 109 S. Ct. 1952 (1989).
27. 110 S. Ct. 1015, 1017.
28. SCAmIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which RNQumiST, C.J., and Wmm,
STEvNs, and KmaNY, JJ., joined. O'CoNNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MAskui, and BLAcKmuN, JJ., joined. Id.
[Vol. 93
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The Court reversed the holding of the Fifth Circuit for lack of
jurisdiction and remanded the case.29 On remand, 0 the Fifth Circuit
vacated the judgment of the district court as it related to the claims
of Arkoma anid the counterclaims of Carden and Limes. 31 As no
question of diversity existed between Arkoma and Magee Drilling,
the ruling of the district court rejecting Magee Drilling's counter-
claim and intervention was affirmed. 32
III. PRIOR LAW
The United States Supreme Court considers a corporation a
"citizen" and has done so for nearly 150 years. 33 However, the Court
has firmly resisted extending this notion of citizenship to other ar-
tificial entities. 34 As the Court has not had a prior opportunity to
specifically consider the nature of a limited partnership, the follow-
ing provides an overview of the Court's reasoning for the distinction
between incorporated and unincorporated entities and a synopsis of
its prior holdings in cases involving various artificial entities.
A. The Corporation
When the Court was first asked to consider the nature of a cor-
poration for the purpose of diversity of citizenship for federal ju-
risdiction, it refused to deem a corporation a "citizen" in its own
right.35 In Bank of United States v. Deveaux, the Court held that
"a corporation... is certainly not a citizen ' 36 and that to determine
citizenship for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, the Court must
"look to the character of the individuals who compose [it]." '37
Thirty-five years later, the Court expressly overruled Deveaux in
Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson.38 In deciding Letson, the Court
29. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1022.
30. Arkoma Assoc. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1990).
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1017.
34. Id. at 1018.
35. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
36. Id. at 86.
37. Id. at 91-92.
38. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
1990]
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put great emphasis on the importance of incorporation.3 9 As an en-
tity formally recognized by the state in which it was incorporated,
the corporation was authorized to sue and be sued in the corporate
nameA0 Its members were not fixed. In fact, the very essence of the
incorporated entity was its immortality. 41 "The great object of an
incorporation is to bestow the character and properties of individ-
uality on a collective and changing body of men." 42 These reasons,
coupled with a popular distaste for the holding in Deveaux, 43 led
the Court to mandate that a corporation was "capable of being
treated as a citizen of [the State which created it], as much as a
natural person."44
This holding was narrow in that it explicitly confined the entity-
as-a-citizen rationale to corporations. 45 Letson was reviewed and af-
firmed ten years later in Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co.4
Though the Court in Marshall relied upon the somewhat different
theory that "those who use the corporate name, and exercise the
faculties conferred by it'47 should be presumed conclusively to be
citizens of the corporation's state of incorporation, it too found that
a corporation, exclusively, could be a "citizen" for diversity juris-
diction."
Letson and Marshall have since been codified, and somewhat
expanded by Congress. Section 1332(c) of title 28 of the U.S. CODE
states that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any.State
by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business.'' 49 It is important to note that while this
39. Id. at 558.
40. Id. at 552.
41. Id. at 559.
42. Id.
43. The court discussed the general disapproval of its prior holdings in Strawbridge and De-
veaux. "[They] have never been satisfactory to the bar, and [they are] not, especially [Deveaux],
entirely satisfactory to the Court that made them." Id. at 555. But rather than appear as bowing to
popular pressure, the Court found the aforementioned reasons to justify overturning Deveaux. See
supra notes 38-42.
44. Id. at 558.
45. Id.
46. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
47. Id. at 329.
48. Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (Supp. 1990).
. [Vol. 93
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legislation makes clear Congress' intention to not unduly restrict a
corporation's access to federal court, it deals exclusively with in-
corporated entities and is silent as to the expected handling of un-
incorporated entities by the court.
B. Unincorporated Entities
Chapman v. Barney0 was the first case subsequent to Letson
where the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether an un-
incorporated association may be given corporate-like "entity" status
for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction.5' Chapman in-
volved an unincorporated joint stock company52 organized under the
laws of New York. The Court held that a joint stock company, as
an entity, could not be regarded as a "citizen" precisely because it
was not incorporated. 53 The Court ruled that, as a joint stock com-
pany is merely a partnership,5 4 diversity jurisdiction could be invoked
only if there existed complete diversity, that is, if each member of
the joint stock company was diverse from each and every opposing
party.5 Further, the Court concluded that even though the joint
stock company "may be authorized by the laws of the State of New
York to bring suit .. . that fact cannot give the company power,
by that name, to sue in federal court." '5 6
This incorporated/unincorporated distinction was again used in
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones.57 This case involved
a Pennsylvania limited partnership association. 58 Citing Chapman,
50. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
51. Id. at 682.
52. A joint stock company is a capital pooling entity with centralized management and trans-
ferable shares like a corporation, yet whose members maintain the property rights and liabilities of
partners in a general partnership. Unlike a corporation, a joint stock company is an entity formed
pursuant to agreement of the parties rather than by a grant of authority from the state of organization.
A. BaommaRo, supra note 12, § 34, at 178.
53. Chapman, 129 U.S. at 682.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
58. In a limited partnership association, Pennsylvania law limits the partner's liability to the
amount of capital contribution to the partnership. See 59 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 341-61 (1964), repealed
in part by 1965 PA. LAWS 519, § 50(g). The association is unlike the limited partnership in the present
case because it has only one class of partner. Association partners have ownership rights in partnership
property not unlike the rights of partners in a general partnership. A. BROMBERo, supra note 12, §
34, at 178-79.
1990]
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the Court held that although Pennsylvania law authorized a limited
partnership association to "sue and be sued by the name of the
association,"5 9 it was not a corporation. Though it possessed "some
of the characteristics of a corporation" and was deemed a "citizen"
by the law of the state which created it, it may not be deemed a
"citizen" under the jurisdictional rule established for corporations. 60
Further, the Court added "that rule [treating corporations as entities
in their own fight] must not be extended. ' 61
These rulings, limiting access to federal court to occasions when
each member of an unincorporated entity satisfied diversity, are not
restricted to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As
recently as 1965, in United States v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc. ,62 the Su-
preme Court considered whether an unincorporated labor union, as
an entity, should be deemed a "citizen" for diversity jurisdiction.
The Court unanimously held that the "doctrinal wall of Chapman
v. Barney"63 must not be breached. The Court in Bouligny refused
to consider the location of the union's principle place of business
for citizenship purposes. 64 Instead, it ruled that citizenship of each
member must be considered and that complete diversity must exist
to command federal jurisdiction.65
The only transgression from this firmly held principle occurred
in the case of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. 6 Russell involved a
Puerto Rican entity known as a sociedad en comandita.67 Though
the entity was unincorporated by United States' standards, the Court
realized that, though a creature of the civil law, it was formally
recognized by the Code.of Puerto Rico as a "juridical entity." ' 6 In
59. Great Southern, 177 U.S. at 455.
60. Id. at 456.
61. Id. at 457.
62. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
63. Id. at 151.
64. Id. at 146.
65. Id. at 147.
66. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
67. The Court examined the sociedad en comandita and expressly rejected the notion that it
was the forerunner to the modem limited partnership. It is an entity formally recognized by Puerto
Rico and as a continuing entity, more closely resembles a corporation. Russell, 288 U.S. at 481.
68. Russell, 288 U.S. at 479.
[Vol. 93
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justifying why the sociedad en comandita was treated as an entity
for diversity jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of its
members, the Court later reasoned in Bouligny that it had been
"fitting an exotic creation of the [Puerto Rican] civil law ... into
a federal scheme which knew it not." 69 Notwithstanding this result,
the Court in Russell was quick to note that barring analogous ex-
tenuating facts, "the tradition of the common law, . . to treat as
legal persons only incorporated groups and to assimilate all others
to partnerships ' 70 would be strictly observed.
C. Navarro Savings Association v. Lee: The "Real Party to the
Controversy" Test
Recently, not all of the federal circuits have strictly followed this
incorporated/unincorporated dichotomy. 71 Those that have seen fit
to allow an unincorporated association to be treated as a "citizen"
for diversity jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of each
member have relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Navarro
Say. Ass'n v. Lee.72 As the reversal in the present case indicated,
this reliance was unfounded and flowed from an over-broad reading
of Navarro.73 However, this case merits discussion, as its misinter-
pretation has been the source of substantiaf controversy. 74
Navarro involved a Massachusetts business trust.75 Eight indi-
vidual trustees brought suit in their own names against a Texas sav-
69. Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 151.
70. Russell, 288 U.S. at 480.
71. See Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 240
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding that when it is possible to clearly identify a class of members of a partnership
as real parties to the controversy, citizenship of that class alone is relevant for diversity purposes);
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1966)
(holding that nondiverse limited partners do not destroy diversity where, under applicable New York
law, limited partners are not real parties to the controversy).
72. 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
73. Navarro provided the basis of the Fifth Circuit's ruling for the case at hand. The Circuit
Court found that as a result of Navarro, the citizenship of the limited partners was "irrelevant" and
that the citizenship of only the general partners should concern the Court. Arkoma Assoc. v. Carden,
874 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1988).
74. The Supreme Court spent substantial time distinguishing Navarro in order to clearly narrow
its holding. Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 110 S. Ct. 1015, 1019-21 (1990).
75. A Massachusetts business trust is defined as: "[A]n unincorporated business organization
created by an instrument, by which property is to be held and managed by trustees for the benefit
,and profit of such persons as may be or may become the holders of transferable certificates evidencing
the beneficial interest in the trust estate." 13 AM. Jutr. 2D Business Trusts § 1 (1964).
1990]
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ings and loan association in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. 6 No trustee was a resident of Texas,
but some of the trust's beneficial shareholders were. 77
Navarro Savings Association moved for dismissal for lack of
complete diversity alleging that the beneficiaries were the real parties
to the controversy and thus any determination of citizenship should
embrace them. 7 Concluding that a business trust is in fact a citizen
of every state in which its shareholders reside, the district court
dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction. 79,
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ex-
plaining that the trustees were real parties in interest because they
had full power to manage and control the trust and to sue on its
behalf.80 The Fifth Circuit directed the district court to proceed to
trial on the merits as complete diversity, existed among the real par-
ties in interest. 81
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, holding that "[f]or
more than 150 years, the law has permitted trustees ... to sue in
their own right, without regard to the citizenship of the trust ben-
eficiaries." '82 Further, the Court concluded that the trustees' interest
was real and substantial, noting that "[tihey have legal title; they
manage the assets; they control litigation. In short, they are real
parties to the controversy. 8 3
However, this application of the real party to the controversy
test was with respect to the eight trustees as individuals. The entity,
the trust, did not bring the suit. The suit was brought by eight
individuals and the question the court considered was whether these
individuals, whose citizenship was neither in dispute nor ever called
into question, were the proper parties to bring the suit. 4 If they
76. Navarro, 446 U.S. at 459.
77. Id. at 460.
78. Id.
79. Lee v. Navarro Say. Ass'n, 416 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
80. Lee v. Navarro Sav. Ass'n, 597 F.2d 421, 427 (5th Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 428.
82. Navarro, 446 U.S. at 465-66.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 458.
[Vol. 93
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were not, and if the beneficial shareholders were, then complete
diversity would have been destroyed.
The Court in Navarro was not applying the real party to the
controversy test to the entity as a whole.85 In fact, the Court dis-
tinguished its prior holdings to clarify this point. Citing Great
Southern, Bouligny, and Chapman, the Court held that "although
corporations suing in diversity long have been 'deemed' citizens,...
unincorporated associations remain mere collections of individuals.
When the 'persons composing such association' sue in their collective
name, they are the parties whose citizenship determines the diversity
jurisdiction of a federal court. 86
The Court further distinguished Navarro from the prior cases
dealing with unincorporated associations. It noted that the law' al-
lowed the trustees to sue either in their individual names or in the
trust name.8 7 In Navarro, the trustees chose to sue in their own
names. Therefore, the Court never needed to reach the question of
how to determine the citizenship of the trust as an entity. The real
party to the controversy discussion merely affirmed the long held
principle that a trustee has a right to sue in his own name, and did
not allude to a new basis for determining the citizenship of unin-
corporated artificial entities. 8
IV. ANALYsIs oF THm HOLDING
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began his inquiry into
the controversy presented by Carden v. Arkoma Associates8 9 with
a discussion of the nature of diversity jurisdiction. He cited the
diversity statute and the requirement for complete diversity estab-
lished by Strawbridge v. Curtiss.9° To determine whether complete
diversity existed in this case, Scalia put forth two questions; first,
whether a limited partnership as an entity may be considered a
"citizen" of the state that created it, and second, whether a federal
85. Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 465-66.
88. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1019.
89. Carden, 110 S. Ct. 1015.
90. Id. at 1017. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
1990]
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court may look to only the citizenship of the general partner to
determine diversity.91
A. A Limited Partnership as a "Citizen" in Its Own Right
Immediately into his opinion, Scalia assaulted the rationale of
the dissent.92 He concluded that the dissent had arrived at the wrong
resolution because it had considered the wrong question. 9 Rather
than look at Arkoma Associates as an entity with the authority to
sue in its own name and then determine the entity's citizenship, the
dissent improperly assumed that the citizenship of the entity was the
state of origination, and then looked to the question of the citi-
zenship of the "other citizens before the court. '94
The problem, Scalia properly suggested, was that there were no
other parties to the controversy. Had there been, then the proper
question would have been which are the real parties to the contro-
versy.95 A party who is not a real party to the controversy is properly
excluded in the determination of whether complete diversity exists.96
However, this case involved only one party as the plaintiff, Arkoma
Associates, the limited partnership. Scalia was logically sound in
submitting as his question to the Court: How is the citizenship of
this entity to be determined?
91. Id.
92. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1017 n.l.
93. Id.:
The dissent reaches a conclusion different from ours primarily because it poses, and
then answers, an entirely different question .... That is the central fallacy from which,
for the most part, the rest of the dissent's reasoning logically follows. The question presented
today is not which of various parties before the Court should be considered for purposes
of determining whether there is complete diversity of citizenship, a question that will gen-
erally be answered by application of the 'real party to the controversy' test. There are not,
as the dissent assumes, multiple respondents before the Court, but only one: the artificial
entity called Arkoma Associates, a limited partnership. And what we must decide is the
quite different question of how the citizenship of that single artificial entity is to be de-
termined which in turn raises the question whether it can (like a corporation) assert its own
citizenship, or rather is deemed to possess the citizenship of its members, and, if so, which
members.
94. 110 S. Ct. at 1023.
95. McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 1 (1844) (holding that the citizenship of one who is
not a real party in interest to the suit need not be considered in determining diversity).
96. Id.
[Vol. 93
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/4
CARDEN V. ARKOMA
Once he established the focus of the Court's deliberation, Scalia
examined the, prior holdings in cases discussing the citizenship of an
entity. He recognized the long standing distinction between incor-
porated and unincorporated entities. 97 Citing Deveaux, Letson, and
Marshall, Scalia reiterated the principle that corporations were to
be considered citizens of the State of incorporation as well as of
the State of the principle place of business.98
Moving to unincorporated entities, Scalia reviewed the holdings
in Chapman, Great Southern, and. Bouligny.99 He focused on the
Court's reluctance to expand the entity-as-a-citizen rationale from
corporations to unincorporated associations./°° He also distinguished
Russell in that although the Court did expand the entity-as-a-citizen
theory in the case of the sociedad en comandita, it did so only in
the face of extenuating circumstances and was not purposefully al-
tering the Court's focus.101 To emphasize this, he acknowledged that
the argument put forth by Arkoma, that through Russell the Court
established a willingness to look beyond the unincorporated surface
of an entity to the underlying structure in order to determine its
citizenship, logically made sense. 102 However, he noted this argument
was expressly advanced and rejected in Bouligny.0 3
Further, Scalia distinguished Navarro on the basis that in that
case, the Court considered only the nature of a common law trust
and the proper characterization of the trustees as real parties to the
controversy.1° The Court did not express an intention to initiate the
practice of looking into unincorporated associations to determine
the real parties to the controversy.105
97. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1018.
98. Id. at 1017-18.
99. Id. at 1018.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103 Id. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104. "Navarro, in short, has nothing to do with the Chapman question ... ." Carden, 110 S.
Ct. at 1019.
105. "That argument [Navarro, by analogy, suggests a willingness of the Court to adjust to
business reality] ... is, to put it mildly, less than compelling." Id.
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Thus, Scalia held that Arkoma Associates as an entity had the
citizenship of each of its members. 1°6 If one of those members de-
stroyed diversity, diversity was destroyed for the entire entity. The
long line of cases holding that the citizenship of an unincorporated
entity was the aggregate of the parts was to be followed.
B. Discriminating Between General and Limited Partners
The second phase of Scalia's opinion examined whether a court
may look to only the general partner when determining the citizen-
shiip of the partnership. 0 7 He found no basis in the law to support
such a proposition. "We have never held that an artificial entity,
suing or being sued in its own name, can invoke the diversity ju-
risdiction of the federal courts based upon the citizenship of some
but not all of its members."'' 0 Further, "[tihis approach [to avoid
destroying diversity] ... finds even less support in our precedent
than looking to the State of organization (for which one could at
least point to Russelo."'09
Scalia properly refuted the argument that only the general part-
ner's citizenship was relevant by again reviewing Chapman, Great
Southern, Bouligny, and Russell to attest to the fact that no element
of control, liability, or equivalency has ever factored into or even
been mentioned in a decision concerning the citizenship of an entity,
incorporated or unincorporated." 0 The dissent insisted that in each
of the aforementioned cases, the members were equal. Thus, in-
herent in those decisions to include each member was the notion
that had they not been equal, a real party to the controversy test
would have been appropriate."' This contention is without merit as
Scalia pointed out: "[g]iven what 180 years of cases have said and
done, as opposed to what they might have said, it is difficult to
106. "The dissent fails to cite a single case in which the citizeriship of an artificial entity.
has been decided by application of the 'real party to the controversy' test that it describes." Id. at
1017.
107. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1019.
108. Id. at 1019-20.
109. Id. at 1019.
110. Id. at 1020-21.
111. Id. at 1024.
[Vol. 93
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understand how the dissent can characterize as 'newly formulated'
the rule that the Court will, without analysis of the particular entity
before it, count every member of an unincorporated association for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.112
The majority of the Court, agreeing with Scalia in this analysis,
held that it will adhere to the oft-repeated rule that diversity juris-
diction in a suit by or against the entity depends on the citizenship
of "all the members," ' "the several persons composing such as-
sociations, '1 1 4 and "each of its members." 115
C. A Deference to Congress
Scalia conceded that the decision in this case was "technical,"
"precedent-bound," and "unresponsive to the policy considerations
raised'by the changing realities of business organization."'1 16 How-
ever, he made no apology for this. Rather, he addressed the in-
appropriateness of the Court to make these policy considerations.
Scalia perceived Congress to be more suited to determine the
nature of the various artificial entities and their respective citizen-
ship. "Such accommodation is not only performed more legitimately
by Congress than by courts, but it is performed more intelligently
by legislation than by interpretation of the statutory word 'citi-
zen."'1 1 7 He also noted that thirty-five years ago in Bouligny, the
Court took a similar stance when it concluded that the citizenship
of an unincorporated labor union was "properly a matter for leg-
islative consideration which cannot adequately or appropriately be
dealt with by this Court."'118
However, Scalia virtually said that he thought allowing an un-
incorporated entity's citizenship to be determined by some alternate
method might be appropriate. In Bouligny, the district court upheld
112. Id. at 1021.
113. Id. (quoting Chapman, 129 U.S. at 682).
114. Id. (quoting Great Southern, 177 U.S. at 456).
115. Id. (quoting Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 146).
116. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1021.
117. Id. at 1022.
118. Id. (quoting Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 147).
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removal to federal court because it could divine "no common sense
reason for treating an unincorporated national labor union differ-
ently from a corporation. ' ' 9 Scalia recognized that this contention
had "considerable merit." 120 Additionally, Scalia conceded that Ar-
koma was "undoubtedly correct" that limited partnerships are func-
tionally similar to other organizations that have access to federal
courts and was "perhaps correct" that basic fairness and substance
over form require that limited partnerships receive similar treat-
ment.1 21 Perhaps Congress will take this as a cue to select the un-
incorporated associations which properly could retain the citizenship
of the State of organization in a corporate-like manner.
D. The Dissenting Opinion
As Scalia's belief with respect to the proper question before the
Court is logically sound, the dissenting opinion, written by Justice
O'Connor is largely irrelevant. As outlined above, O'Connor refused
to consider the citizenship of the entity but rather proceeded into
a lengthy discussion dealing with the "real parties to the contro-
versy." Though her analysis of law with respect to this question
is informative and thorough, it is nonetheless inapplicable to the
present case.
O'Connor did, however, *put forth several ideas which warrant
discussion. In defending the proposition that a limited partnership's
citizenship should be determined by only the citizenship of the gen-
eral partner, O'Connor noted that virtually all of the states have
adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act which governs the
control and management of these partnerships.' z2 Though this fact
does not support her call for the Court to legislate, 12 the uniformity
119. Id. (quoting Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 146).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1022-23.
123. Id. at 1026-27 (citing UNffoiR Lmnmn PTNmsm, ACT § 26, 6 U.L.A. 614 (1969)).
124. Uniformity among the various states as to the organization of a certain entity has never
been a basis in a Court decision to determine the citizenship of the entity. However, the emphasis
on the formality of incorporation has been used which would be analogous to the adoption of the
Usrwoa Lnummr PAmRsump ACT. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
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among the States is a factor for Congress to consider should they
initiate discussions to treat limited partnerships more like uniform
corporations.
O'Connor also presented the concern that perhaps implicit in the
Court's holding was that the failure to consider each member of an
unincorporated association would expand diversity jurisdiction at a
time when the courts are already seriously overburdened.'2 She at-
tempted to show the superficial nature of this concern by presenting
a way to circumvent it through a class action suit, 126 though the
efficacy of this approach is doubtful. 27 Regardless, it was not ap-
parent that this was truly a concern of the majority. Scalia's deferral
to Congressional action did not indicate a desire to unduly restrict
access to federal court. Rather, it was only, as he indicated, a refusal
to legislate from the bench. He makes no statement which could be
construed to be a concern about overburdened courts and any in-
ference to the contrary would be mere speculation.'2
V. CONCLUSION
The decision by the United States Supreme Court in Carden v.
Arkoma Associates129 is noteworthy for several reasons. Most im-
portantly, it draws a bright line distinction between incorporated
and unincorporated entities at a critical point in the litigation. Had
the Court decided to place the burden upon the lower courts to
determine who were the real parties in interest for the multitude of
unincorporated entities created and yet to be created, chaos and
uncertainty would hover over every case until the final appeal on
what should be the simple question of jurisdiction. Scalia was correct
125. Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1027.
126. Id.
127. See generally Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 337 (3rd Cir.) (a class action is in-
appropriate when the law of the forum state requires that suit be brought by or against an association
as an entity), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958). See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291, 297-301 (1973) (stating that even where the applicable state law permits class action by or against
unincorporated associations, in a diversity action, the claim of each member of the class must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount).
128. O'Connor appeared to realize that this allegation is speculative in that she initiated the
discussion with "[t]he concern perhaps implicit in the Court's holding today .... " Id. at 1027
(emphasis added).
129. 110 S. Ct. 1015 (1990).
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in assuming these are "questions more readily resolved by legislative
prescription than by legal reasoning, and questions whose complexity
is particularly unwelcome at the threshold state of determining
whether a court has jurisdiction. 130
The effects of Carden can be seen already in the few months
since the decision was issued. 131 One can expect the decision to be
somewhat broader than its specific holding. Scalia's thorough dis-
cussion as to the nature of an unincorporated entity leaves the im-
pression that this decision will govern the citizenship of most all
unincorporated entities and not be restricted to limited partnerships
as the holding might suggest.
Finally, Scalia's appreciation for the subtle distinguishing points
between the prior holdings of the Court and his logical consistency
throughout the opinion undoubtedly render this case invaluable for
determining diversity jurisdiction among artificial entities. Scalia left
no stone unturned in supporting his rationale with judicial precedent.
Eventually Congress may, and probably should, act to provide a
method of determining citizenship which would take into account
business realities. However, until that time, Carden furnishes a sound
and workable resolution.
Joseph J. Buch
130. Id. at 1022.
131. Several cases have cited Carden as the basis for dismissal. See McMoran Oil & Gas Co.
v. KN Energy, Inc., 907 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismissing the action for lack of subject matter
based upon diversity jurisdiction in a case involving a limited partnership); RLI Inc. Co. v. U.S.
Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. IMl. 1990) (dismissing the action for incomplete
diversity in a case involving an insurance group construed as a partnership); Goldberg & Assoc. v.
Collins, Tuttle & Co., 739 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Il. 1990).
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